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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

S'l\\TE OF t:TAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.
10068

vs.

CLOYD REED ALLRED,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
ST.ATE~IENT

OF THE CASE

This is a criminal action in which appellant was
charged with the commission of burglary in the second
degree and grand larceny.

DISPOSITIOX IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a criminal jury from a verdict finding appellant guilty of both burglary in the
second degree and grand larceny. The appellant appeals
through his court appointed counsel.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction, as a
matter of law, or failing that, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 3:00 o'clock a.m. in the morning
of September 5, 1963, Kim's Market, located in Copperton, Utah, was forcibly entered and certain items of
property removed by two unidentified individuals who
were seen by a tenant, residing in the upstairs apartments, leaving the market ( tr. 51). No identification
was possible from any witness as they were between
fifty and seventy-five feet from the tenant's window
(tr. 52). No witness was able to recognize the defendant (tr. 53). Ruth Goff, owner of the business, had
secured the market doors at about 8:00 o'clock p.m.
prior to the entry (tr. 61). Upon arrival, witness Goff
observed that the front door had been forced open (tr.
61). The owner claimed that a quantity of cigarettes,
a .38 caliber pistol, a pair of safety boots, a pair of coveralls and a radio, having a value in excess of Fifty Dollars ($50.00), were missing ( tr. 60, 61), upon investigation and invntory the following morning. Mrs. Goff also
testified that the store's check book was missing, along
with the check protector (tr. 69, 70). She identified
State's Exhibit No. 4 as one of the checks which had
been taken out of the check book ( tr. 70), as well as
the safety boots, coveralls and gun. (Exhibits 1, 2 and
3).
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These exhibits were introduced in evidence over
the ohjcdion of defendant's counsel who had, prior to
the trial. filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the
grounds that the items had been obtained through illegal search and seizure of the defendant's car and his
apartment ( tr. 2). The hearing on that phase of the
case took place at 9 :};') o'clock a.m., October 16, 1963,
hd'orc .Judge Yan Cott who, after hearing defendant's
evidence, overruled his motion and ordered the trial to
proceed (tr. 32-49).
The testimony supporting defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence showed that about noon on September 6, 1963, Deputy Sheriff Paul LaBounty, while
making a routine investigation following the alleged
burglary, without search warrants or warrant for arrest
ot' the defendant, spotted the defendant driving an
automobile near Seventh South and Third East Streets,
Salt Lake City, Utah, and attempted to overtake him
(tr. 35). The defendant parked the car he was driving
at 314 East Seventh South and ran away from the
Deputy. ~Ir. LaBounty searched the car, found the
boots and coveralls allegedly taken from Kim's Market
(tr. 36) . The Deputy claimed this evidence was in plain
sight on the front seat, whereas, the defendant testified
it was in the trunk compartment and further explained
that he had obtained the items the night before from a
friend. The car was not impounded ( tr. 37) . The
Deputy n1ade no effort to obtain a search warrant, but
took the boots and coveralls into his possession. Sometime during the 6th or 7th of September, 1963, the
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Sheriff made two visits to defendant's apartment without the consent of defendant. A companion, who lived
in the apartment with the defendant, allowed the Sheriff
to search the apartment without a search warrant. On
the second visit, the Sheriff had obtained a search warrant and at this time located a .38 caliber pistol (tr.
41). The search warrant included a description of the
boots and coveralls which had previously been impounded. Donald Madsen, a companion of the defendant who resided there along with four or five other
individuals, allowed LaBounty to search the apartment
(tr. 44).
The defendant, upon learning that a warrant for
his arrest was outstanding, voluntarily turned himself
in after first arranging for a bail bondsman. Witnesses
for the State testified that defendant did not confess
or admit participation in the crime of burglary in the
second degree or grand larceny, only that defendant
claimed he had received this property in good faith,
learning later that it had been stolen and that was the
reason for his voluntarily turning himself over to the
authorities.
Witness Robert L. Nelson, operator of the Shoppers Market, at 1506 East 4160 South, identified the
defendant as the person who presented State's Exhibit
No. 4, the stolen check, to him. No criminal charge was
filed on the stolen check against this defendant, nor was
the defendant charged with the crime of receiving stolen
property.
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The jury returned guilty verdicts for each charge
(b·. W. tr. 18). Judge \'an Cott, on his own motion,
ordered the jury verdict of guilty of the crime of burglary in the second degree vacated and set aside and
dismissed that count of the information on October 17,
19ti:J ( tr. 28) on the grounds that the State had failed
to prove said charge of burglary in the second degree
ugainst the defendant. The defendant was sentenced
on October 28, 1963, to the Utah State Prison for the
indeterminate term as provided by law for the crime
of grand larceny, and the commitment issued November
I, 1963.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT
SFPPORT THE VERDICT THAT THE DEFEXD.ANT 'VAS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
OF GR.A.ND LARCENY.
In view of the court's own motion setting aside the
guilty verdict of the jury on the crime of burglary in
the second degree, it would seem to follow that the
court should have directed a verdict of not guilty on that
charge and not submitted that charge to the jury. The
court's failure to do so amounted to prejudicial error
and certainly influenced the jury in its guilty verdict
on the grand larceny charge. Viewed in this perspective
and the presumption (76-38-1 UCA 1953) that possession of property recently stolen, when the person in
possession fails to make a satisfactory explanation,
5
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shall be deemed prima facie evidence of guilt and in
the absence of such instruction to the jury, following
76-38-1, the State did not establish the necessary elements to constitute larcency. (State v. Merritt., 67
Utah 325, 247 Pac. 497, 501). Absent proof of felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading or driving
away of the personal property of another, the jury
could not infer that the defendant committed the larceny unless it considered that defendant had an unexplainable possession of property recently stolen. The
case, however, was not submitted to the jury on the
theory of recent possession of stolen property.
There was absolutely no evidence identifying the
defendant with the forcible entry into the market and
no proof of the necessary elements to make out the
crime of larceny, except possession of the boots and
coveralls. Defendant was not charged with receiving
stolen property (76-38-12 UCA 1953) which is punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five
years, whereas, grand larceny is punishable by a term
not exceeding ten years.
The obvious doubt in the mind of the trial court
in setting aside the burglary conviction must also favor
the same doubt concerning the elements of grand larceny and where, as here, the case was not submitted
on the theory of recent possession of stolen property,
the conviction should be set aside.
POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
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~lOTIO.\'

TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ILLEG..:\.LLY OBT.t-\l.NED BY THE STATE AND
1~ .:\LLO\\'ING TilE STATE TO INTROlJl'l'E SUCH EYIDENCE.
On June 19, 1961, the Supreme Court of the
l Tnited States in illapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed.
:!d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684, in a landmark decision, overruling its earlier decision in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
:.!5, 93 L. Ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1395, held that, as a matter
of due process, evidence obtained by a search and seizure
in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible
in a state court as it is in a federal court. In the instant
case, the State, without a proper warrant, obtained possession of the boots and coveralls and, still without a
proper warrant, searched the defendant's apartment.
The fact that Deputy Sheriff LaBounty later obtained
a warrant when he searched the apartment the second
time to locate the gun does not cure his action.
It will be recalled that no warrant for defendant's
arrest was outstanding at the time, nor had he committed any crime in the presence of the officer when,
more than thirty-two hours later, he was chased down
by the officer on Third East Street. Defendant's car
could haYe been impounded and a search warrant obtained without jeopardy or prejudice to the State's
interest. This was not done. The officer illegally took
possession of the coveralls and boots and paved the way
for subsequent State search for the gun.
In the past. this court has been reluctant to over7
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turn convictions based upon such questionably obtained
evidence, but now the Supreme Court of the United
States has issued its mandate, and this court should
hold that the trial judge erred, as a matter of law, in
denying defendant's motion to suppress such evidence
and permitting such evidence to be introduced at the
trial.
POINT 3. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY.
The court's instruction No. 7 to the jury:
"You are instructed that evidence has been
offered and received in this case that the defendant on or about the time of the commission of this
offense took flight from a sheriff here in Salt
Lake County, Utah. This, if you find it to be
true, is a circumstance to be weighed by you as
tending in some degree to prove consciousness of
guilt and is entitled to more or less weight according to the circumstances of the particular
case. It is not sufficient of itself to establish the
guilt of the defendant, but the weight to which
that circumstance is entitled is a matter for you
to determine in connection with all of the other
facts and circumstances in the case."
was in error in that it indicated to the jury that the
defendant on or about the time of the commission of this
offense took flight from a sheriff here in Salt Lake
County, Utah. The offense was committed at about 3:00
o'clock a.m., September 5, 1963. The incident of the
defendant's flight from Deputy LaBounty was some
twenty-eight hours later, on September 6, 1963. Under
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this instruction the jury was told, in effect, that the
deft'ndant was in fresh flight from the offense and was
not instructed to also consider the fact that after the
defendant learned that a warrant for his arrest had
been issued, he voluntarily surrendered himself to
authorities, after first arranging for a bail bond. The
tlefendant had commited no crime on September 6,
19H:J. and the officer was merely interested in interrogating hi1n as a part of his investigation. His flight,
under such circu1nstances, should not have been weighed
as a circumstance by the jury indicating guilt or a lack
of guilt.
Following the court's instruction and the arguments of counsel on behalf of the State and the defendant to the jury, the court gave an additional instruction,
Xo. 8 (a) , which provided:
"Counsel and Members of the Jury: I have
one more instruction that I am going to give
you. It is in reference to this matter of the exhibit, that is, the check in question .
....You are instructed that the defendant is not
charged with the issuance of a bad check in this
matter. but if the evidence in reference to the
check is found by you of value in the solution of
the burglary charged and the grand larceny
charged herein, you may consider that evidence
in the solution of these charges for which the
defendant has been charged, even though you
may find or believe that it might show evidence
of another crime not charged here.
"The fact that it might show another charge,
if you thought it did, does not render it incom-
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petent for your consideration in reference to the
charges for which the defendant is here standing
trial."
Why the court gave such an instruction is not
clear from the record. It was, however, excepted to by
counsel for defendant ( tr. 127). The prejudice in such
exception is clear and obvious. In effect, the court has
said that while the defendant is not charged with the
issuance of the bad check (Exhibit No. 4), the jury
may consider that evidence in determining defendant's
guilt on the burglary and grand larceny charges. There
the court should have ended its instruction, but it went
on to add, "even though you may find or believe that
it might show evidence of another crime not charged
here." In effect the court was indicating to the jury
by this additional comment that the court felt that the
defendant was guilty of a bad check charge. The court
should not have given such instruction. Witness Nelson only identified the defendant as the person who
presented the check to his establishment. There was no
other evidence that defendant received any money or
had uttered the instrument. While his possession of that
check may have been possession of recently stolen property, the jury was not instructed to consider this theory
of the State's case. Total effect of such instruction is
prejudicial to the defendant in that it led the jury to
believe that the defendant may also have been guilty of
a bad check charge, even though that crime was not
being tried.
The court's lengthy instruction No.3 is also objected to for the reason that the jury was not instructed to
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consider defendant's explanation of the recently stolen
property in his possession from which the prima facie
prtsumption of grand larceny arises as a matter of law.
Instruction No. 6 was also faulty in that it allowed
the jury to speculate on the value of various items to
make the determination that the goods exceeded the
value of Fifty Dollars ($50.00), and in this regard the
jury considered a portable radio and an unknown quantity of cigarettes as part of the corpus delicti, where
the proof on the taking of these items was insufficient
to go to the jury. The boots have a value of Fifteen
Dollars ($15.00) and the coveralls, about Six Dollars
($6.00). No competent evidence as to the value of the
gun was shown. It is submitted that the court should
have specified the particular items, making up the
corpus delicti, in order to arrive at the statutory value.
CONCLUSION
As a court appointed counsel, I believe there is
merit to this appeal, and I believe the appeal should be
sustained and the conviction set aside as a matter of
law on the basis of the specifications of error above
stated.
Respectfully submitted this ·1.-t..day of May, 1964.
DRAPER, SAXDACK

&

SAPERSTEIN

A. 'V ally Sandack
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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ADDENDUM
•
I
Since the above brief was filed, counsel's
attention has been called to two recent cases decidec
by the Supreme Court of the United States appearing
in United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers'
Edition, Volume 11, April 13, 1964, which further
support appellant's Point 2, Motion to Suppress
Evidence.

See Preston v. United States, 11 L. ed. 2d,
777, and Stoner v. California, 11 L. ed. 2d 856,
which extend/the doctrine of illegal search and
seizure to the automobile and hotel rooms of the
defendant.
.,.
. .!

This Addendum dated this lOth day of
June, 1964.
DRAPER, SANDACK & SAPERSTEil'
A. Wally Sandack

I

Attorneys for Defendant- Appellant
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Mailed a copy of the foregoing to A. Pratt
Kesler, Attorney General of Utah, State Capitol
Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah, and to Jay Banks,
District Attorney, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake
City, Utah, attorneys for.,.~ ponde.· n.ct this l.Oth day
of June, 1964.
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